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# Local Capacities for Peace Meets Conflict Resolution Practice

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## Abstract

*Relief and development workers have not seen themselves as doing peacebuilding until recently, and have noted the negative impact of aid in many cases. This article suggests how the Local Capacities for Peace Project (LCPP) model can be informed by conflict resolution practice to create relief and development interventions leading to peace.*

## Introduction

During the period 1995-1999 many international humanitarian aid agencies were asking what it meant to do peacebuilding as part of their work. Some felt that emergency relief should not try to do too many things, but to focus on saving lives in emergency situations. Others felt that relief given without being used as a peacebuilding tool was wasteful, if not harmful (McFarlane 2001:x). As human-made disasters proliferated at the end of the millennium, relief agency soul-searching was going on. For those agencies that had dual relief and development roles, a deliberate peacebuilding component for their humanitarian relief strategy became very attractive.<sup>1</sup>

This soul-searching coincided with a tremendous expansion of peacemaking programmes in North American and European universities. In 1994 it was fairly rare for a university to have a peace department, or center, or some such unit. In 2000 it was rarer for a university not to have one.<sup>2</sup> Since both relief agencies and peace organisations are drawn to work in the same conflict environments, it is surprising how little academic and practical cross-fertilisation there has been. This may be due to the basic difference between academics, who primarily study phenomena, and the hands-on sort of people one finds in the field distributing relief.

This paper is an attempt by a conflict resolution practitioner to apply lessons from the conflict field to the practices of relief and development, and to consider the lessons relief and development practice has for conflict resolution. The study will look primarily at the relief agency-driven Local Capacities for Peace Project and at the peacemaking processes developed by practitioners in the restorative justice field.

## Local Capacities for Peace Project

The Local Capacities for Peace Project (Anderson 1999) is a collaboration of many humanitarian relief organisations searching for a way to avoid the harmful aspects of relief work on recipient populations. The LCPP process began with a series of issue papers by Mary Anderson in 1994-95. The collaborating partners then produced 15 case studies demonstrating their approaches to the issues raised by Anderson. Feedback workshops were held, and then 12 of the partners initiated implementation projects using the Framework, which had been developed. During this period Anderson's 1999 book was published. The project is now in a mainstreaming mode, working with collaborating

agencies and others to implement use of the Framework tool shown below (Collaborative for Development Action, n.d.) (<http://www.cdainc.com/lcpp-index.htm>).

As the Collaborative for Development Action Web site describes it:

The Local Capacities for Peace Project is a collaborative effort of non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and donor agencies seeking to find ways to provide assistance to people in conflict settings that help local people disengage and find alternatives rather than exacerbating the conflict (Collaborative for Development Action, n.d. <http://www.cdainc.com/pubs/case1.htm>).

Generally speaking, according to Anderson, aid unavoidably becomes part of the conflict scenario and can make things worse as well as better. The hope was to develop new methods for identifying how to avoid making things worse and to identify methods for delivering aid which could actually make things better. Anderson's book is titled appropriately: *Do No Harm: How Aid Can Support Peace – or War* (Anderson 1999).

The project ultimately found a simple, yet profound method for analysing humanitarian aid projects. It recognised that there are social 'dividers' in any situation. These dividers are local capacities for conflict. There are also social 'connectors' which are local capacities for peace. Choices made in planning and executing an aid programme should aim to strengthen connectors while weakening, or at least not strengthening, the dividers. This includes considering the impact of injected resources and the ethical implications of actions taken (Anderson 1999).

One of Anderson's examples is the desire to secure relief supplies so that they get to the intended recipients, one of the more common problems faced by relief agencies. If security for the supplies is provided by hiring armed guards to protect the goods, income is provided to those involved in armed conflict that currently control the marshalling area. This method also sends the implicit message that those with guns are to be obeyed. There are other problems as well. This means that hiring armed guards tends to strengthen social dividers in the community. Anderson says:


It is impossible for aid to adopt the modes of warfare without reinforcing their legitimacy. The implicit ethical message of the use of arms reinforces the belligerence and reliance on threat to achieve goals that pervade the war environment (1999:56).

A different method might be to invite the local elders' council to develop and implement a plan for securing the goods. This method would tend to strengthen the natural connections of people in the community and those involved in the armed conflict would get no new support, tangible or intangible. Anderson (1999:136) reports an approach of this sort used by Trocaire in Somalia.

The visual aid devised for the LCPP Framework helps one to think through these dividers and connectors (see figure p. 87).

This tool is used in assessing situations, planning a response, and in evaluating the results of the response. The method is particularly designed for use by humanitarian relief agencies in areas of armed conflict, and draws on the experience of relief agencies in such situations. Development workers have seen the potential usefulness of the tool in their work as well. Efforts to test that use are underway, particularly in places where there is high potential for violent conflict. The Center for the Study and Promotion of Peace<sup>3</sup> in Yogyakarta, Indonesia, for instance, offers an advanced workshop for staff of national and international organisations doing relief and development work throughout the Indonesian archipelago. The workshop includes applying the Local Capacities for Peace (LCP) concept to the situations faced by participants. The larger international relief

**Framework for considering the impact of aid on conflict**



Source: LCP Graphic (Anderson 1999:69)

and development organisations working in Indonesia also have their own staff trained as trainers in LCP application.

From the perspective of a conflict resolution practitioner, the LCP tool can be sharpened by applying some of the models designed for use in conflict intervention. The visual aid most often used in talking about these concepts is the following Cooperative Resolution Flowchart which was adapted from the original created by Ron Claassen at Fresno Pacific University’s Center for Peacemaking and Conflict Studies. It was developed from the experience in the victim offender reconciliation process. It also applies the interest-based negotiation strategy developed by the Harvard Negotiation Project (Fisher and Ury 1991).

The LCP and conflict resolution models have been used alone until now. Let us look at what happens when they come together in a relief and development scenario. As an example, let us use the very real situation on the island of Ambon, in Indonesia, and an imaginary planned response to the conflict there, which is beginning to appear intractable.

**The Case of Ambon**

The conflict broke out in January 1999 following a fight between a Christian public transport driver and two or more Muslim men who asked him for money. When the taxi driver returned with friends, the Muslim men ran into a Muslim neighborhood and shouted that a Christian was trying to kill them (Hartanto & Pinontoan 2002). A year later the fighting had spread throughout the 850,000 square kilometer province, over 5,000 had been killed, and there were 500,000 internally displaced persons (International

Crisis Group 2000:iii) as Muslims and Christians fled to areas where their group was more numerous.

Political turmoil was new to the Maluku Islands, which had generally been referred to as a good example of Christians and Muslims living together in harmony. As of this writing in August 2002 there continue to be regular violent incidents which are described by police and political authorities as being aimed at preventing a return to stability. Involvement of rogue elements of the police and military, as well as paramilitaries from outside the province, has played an important role in the escalation and continuation of the violence (Hartanto & Pinontoan 2002).

Relief agencies operating in Indonesia rushed aid to the province in an effort to deal with the tremendous displacement of people (United Nations Resident Coordinator 2000). There was a desire on the part of some organisations to create a peacebuilding response with their aid, knowing that the initial relief effort would quickly become a development project as people returned to ruined homes, businesses and fields. The author had the opportunity to consult with several international organisations as we worked together at crafting a response. We wanted to use what we had learned from the LCP Framework, and what had been learned by conflict resolution practitioners, in developing both short and long-term responses. We were guided in part by John Paul Lederach's 'Working Matrix for Developing an Infrastructure for Peacebuilding' (Lederach 1997), which calls for planning well beyond the crisis stage.

### **Cooperative Resolution Flowchart**


The Cooperative Resolution Flowchart begins at the top with a conflict, the inter-religious conflict in Ambon for instance. Any intervention in that situation needs to be designed as a humanitarian relief and follow-on development response, informed by both the LCP and conflict resolution models. The object, in the language of LCP, is for the planned intervention to 'do no harm.' That is not good enough. The intervention needs to not just avoid doing harm, but to make a positive contribution to peace in that place where peace is much needed.<sup>4</sup>

While relief and development people often work separately, they share similar concerns and serve the same people within a short time period. LCP came into being, in part, to address relief efforts. It paid little attention to preparing people for the development work that would follow, usually being done by different organisations (Anderson 1999).

From a conflict practitioner's perspective the first question to be asked in beginning to craft a response is whether the contending parties in the conflict are willing to use a cooperative dispute resolution method, meaning some form of mediation or negotiation. Another way to describe the necessary attitude is 'a commitment to be constructive' (Ruth-Heffelbower 1999:86). If the parties are all committed to being constructive, cooperative processes have a good chance of success. Of all the steps in the flowchart this one is the most difficult. Most western mediation training focuses on what to do after the parties are committed to being constructive. That is actually the easiest part of conflict resolution. The hard part of conflict resolution is leading people to the point of being constructive—the blocks to cooperation have to be identified and overcome.

If we were to assess the situation in Ambon with an eye to determining whether the parties were committed to being constructive, we would say that while there were many people interested in cooperation, there were significant pockets of resistance to resolving

### Cooperative Resolution Flowchart



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the situation peacefully. Not all stakeholders were yet ready to cooperate on a relief and development plan, let alone on resolving the broader conflict.

From the LCP perspective the first task is to identify the social connectors and dividers in the society and their relative strengths. Here there are many hopeful signs in Ambon. While people have been prevented by violence from interacting across religious lines, civil society has been growing in depth and breadth. Since the fall of the authoritarian President Suharto in 1998, many new indigenous non-governmental organisations have sprung up, and the civil society connectors one looks for are emerging. The faculty of Pattimura University, for instance, has been able to keep teaching students in makeshift facilities since the destruction of their campus. Working under such trying conditions the faculty has developed a strong sense of mission and commitment to each other.<sup>5</sup>

A conflict practitioner, determining that both sides were not willing to use cooperative

processes to resolve the conflict, would then ask how the intensity of the conflict could be increased so as to raise the cost of being uncooperative. He/she might also ask how the cost of cooperation could be lowered so as to encourage the contending parties toward cooperation. The question of whether a third-party intervention would be appropriate would also be considered. Strategies would be developed, assessed and implemented. This is the way in which blocks to cooperation are identified and worked on. It can be a very long and complex process, as has been the case in Ambon.

One very significant block to cooperation in the Ambon conflict is the use of violence to punish and terrorise people and groups who try to cooperate with the other side. During my time working in Ambon with a mixed group of Muslims and Christians there was a bomb scare in the building, and two bombings in the city. Areas where Christians and Muslims mix are the usual targets. We were working in a neutral building, yet Muslims had to enter from the Muslim side and Christians from the Christian side, walking past heavily armed sentries whose neutrality was unknown. Our colleagues from Ambon needed a strong commitment to being constructive in order to participate in our UNICEF sponsored training event. This large neutral building in which we worked was destroyed a few months later.

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The LCP model also looks for blocks, identifying the dividers that prevent cooperation and developing strategies to do emergency relief while weakening these dividers and strengthening connectors. The net result is quite similar, the main difference being that a conflict practitioner is not usually concerned directly with bringing tangible resources into the situation. For a relief agency primarily concerned with doing relief work while doing no harm, recognising that an additional goal is trying to encourage the sides toward cooperation can help with understanding the functions of dividers and connectors. The goal is cooperation in the distribution of relief. Relief (and how it is handled) can be a significant force in encouraging cooperation instead of competition. Relief can just as easily make matters worse if it does not plan-in a peacebuilding component; a relief programme that strengthens dividers will make both the lives of the people involved and the conflict practitioner's work more difficult.

This is a point in the process where conflict practitioners and relief agencies can work together very productively, creating a climate for cooperation by the methods used to distribute relief. This is the opportunity that is often lost in the crush of events. The recent movement within international relief organisations to include the peacebuilding agenda in their relief planning is a positive change.

Let us look again at our proposed project on the island of Ambon. In the midst of ongoing sporadic violence, people on all sides have a need to rebuild houses, get new tools and seeds, and generally start getting normal life going again as they come down from the hills or refugee camps. There are also many internally displaced people still in need of emergency relief supplies. Relief and development agencies are anxious to help with all these needs.

Cooperation among contending parties, however, is in short supply. A detailed analysis of dividers and connectors would show that there is a general lack of trust between

groups, and that while some people think they would benefit from cooperation, others see themselves as benefiting from separation. With the influx of Muslim paramilitaries, there are some who think a military solution is possible. Everyone would not see peace as beneficial.<sup>6</sup> How does one work toward relief and development that strengthens local capacities for peace in such a situation?

The question can be expressed either as 'how can the connectors be strengthened and the dividers weakened as relief and development work is done?' or as 'how can relief and development work be done in a way that raises the cost of being uncooperative and lowers the cost of being cooperative?' An example of both is to identify organisations ready and willing to work across party lines, forming cooperative groups of Muslims and Christians, and to channel funds and relief supplies through them to cooperative groups, while always inviting people outside these cooperative groups to join them. This process strengthens connectors, rewards cooperation, and lowers the cost of being cooperative by placing no blocks in the path for those ready to become cooperative.

The aid groups observed working at this intervention did their best to identify indigenous organisations that had the ability to work with both Christians and Muslims. Working with both sides was made more difficult by the presence of many roadblocks throughout the island manned by armed men. A truck loaded with relief supplies driven by a Muslim would have trouble at some roadblocks, and a Christian driver would have trouble at others. Routes had to be carefully planned and drivers had to be brave. Expatriates were not able to move safely throughout the island. Groups able to successfully move supplies to the intended recipients under these conditions were few, but they did exist. By working through such groups important social connectors were strengthened, while violent groups were not strengthened.

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As this type of relief and development work begins to create greater trust among formerly contending parties, a time comes when there is willingness to use cooperative methods to work at differences. If relief and development organisations encourage the people they work with to use cooperative processes to work at both the immediate and the underlying problem, they will be in a position to empower conflict resolution processes with physical and financial supports, and expert assistance where that is needed. Throughout, the aid flows in a way that demonstrates a preferential option for the cooperative. Blocks to cooperation are not increased by the manner in which aid is given, nor are the uncooperative rewarded for their recalcitrance. Workshops on conflict resolution conducted by UNICEF in Ambon were only possible because UNICEF had been preparing the ground in these ways.

When people are ready, it is time to help them to move on down the flowchart with a process for reconciling injustices.

### ***Reconciling Injustices***

Victim-offender mediation has been with us in a formal way for over 20 years, and has demonstrated its efficacy in dealing with the harm done by crime all over the world (Zehr 1996). Usually referred to as 'restorative justice' concepts, the basic idea of victim-offender work is to make the victim as whole as possible while restoring the offender to the community as a productive person. Particularly important for the victim is to regain some of the control lost through becoming a victim, and to begin the healing process. Particularly important for the offender is taking responsibility for his or her actions and making things as right as possible with the victim.

There are four basic movements in reconciliation (Claassen 1996):

1. Forming a commitment to be constructive;
2. Acknowledging the injustice;
3. Restoring the equity; and
4. Being clear about future intentions.

When analysing the connectors and dividers in a community, it is helpful to include provisions for these four movements as connectors, and to identify the community's natural methods for promoting these four movements. Aid can be used to strengthen those community resources, paving the way for reconciliation. It is also necessary to examine differences in understandings of justice, so that efforts at reconciliation do not inadvertently strengthen dividers.

Victim-offender work as presently practised arose, in part, from the realisation that traditional communities provided natural methods for these movements to occur, while modern life, particularly in the developed countries, separated people from these traditional methods. Traditional methods for encouraging these movements of reconciliation are rarely effective across cultures. Modern life creates many such cross-cultural situations.

By identifying and strengthening natural reconciliation methods as connectors, while identifying and making explicit those differences in understandings of justice which have led to confusion, those offering aid can play a significant role in either re-establishing or establishing community capacities for peace. *Re-establishing* happens where a mono-cultural group has been disrupted and needs assistance, or at least the absence of impediments, with remembering and applying their traditional methods. One example of such an impediment would be the transfer of power from traditional leaders to young, educated persons who, by speaking English, get jobs with relief agencies and control access to aid when a refugee group has been resettled in the United States.

*Establishing* happens where heterogeneous groups are thrust together by conflict and have no traditional methods for handling reconciliation across cultural barriers. By encouraging development of cross-cultural groups able to bridge the divide, aid agencies can significantly increase local capacity for peace. Methods for creating such groups are described in the report of work in this area funded by the US Office of Refugee Resettlement (Ruth-Heffelbower 1999).

While Anderson's work is focused on the work of agencies offering humanitarian aid in emergency situations, usually of violent conflict, her concepts can be equally useful for peacebuilders in any situation. Let us look at how various connectors and dividers can be affected by a focus on the four movements of reconciliation. These are illustrative, and it is hoped that the reader can quickly think of many other possibilities.

### **Commitment to be Constructive**

In any conflict situation trust is the first casualty (not truth, as the usual saying goes). For whatever reason, some reasonable, others not, trust diminishes and allows a cycle of conflict to begin (Ruth-Heffelbower 1999:42). When people trust each other, they presume the best intentions from each other. When a confusing event occurs, they assume the other person has their best interests at heart, and delay judgement while they check it out. Where there is a lack of trust, confusion is quickly resolved by blaming the other person. When we want to work at reconciliation the first step has to be agreeing to suspend judgement and to work at being constructive, even when it appears the other person is not. Without this commitment, the other steps don't work.

Aid agencies and other peacebuilders work toward trust when they gather stakeholders and discuss community needs. One begins by explaining the idea of a commitment to be constructive, and challenging the group to adopt that attitude. The next step is to ask the group to devise a process to be used for resolving misunderstanding when it happens so that the commitment to be constructive can be built on a solid base. People must learn to suspend judgement while information is obtained to help understand the situation. One method of creating trust is to create a 'rumour centre' which is in charge of receiving all rumours, checking them out, and giving correct information to the people. When such a locally owned, aid supported group is in existence and properly functioning, people are much more willing to suspend judgement while the truth is ascertained.

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In areas of violent conflict where tit-for-tat retribution is happening, rumours are often the cause of new attacks. By stopping the cycle of rumour, attack, and retribution, strong new local capacity for peace is created, insulating people from the work of both provocateurs and honest misinformation. The rumor central group can quickly develop high credibility that allows it to disseminate other information that might not be believed coming directly from the source. The human rights group ELS-HAM, an advocate for human rights in Papua (the Indonesian half of New Guinea), has developed this 'rumour central' function as part of its basic work, opening other opportunities for peacebuilding.

### **Acknowledge Injustices**

Once a commitment to be constructive is in place, it is possible to begin acknowledging the injustices that have occurred. Cultures handle this task differently. Whether this is done western-style with the parties face to face, or eastern-style through an intermediary, the key is for the injured party to tell how the injustice feels to them, and for the other side to acknowledge these feelings of injustice. In western victim offender mediation the victim and offender sit together and talk these things through. It is also possible for a representative of the other party, particularly if it is a group, to do the listening and acknowledging. Someone else can also represent the injured one.

Acknowledgement does not mean agreement. One may believe you are irrational to have the feelings you have. So long as you sincerely acknowledge those feelings as yours

without trying to defend yourself, the process works. One of the methods used to help people through these processes in the aftermath of extreme violence is to have groups made of people from both sides tell one another about the experience, including both facts and feelings. As the others actively listen without questioning or defending, the injustices feel acknowledged. These sorts of groups can be easily included in humanitarian aid plans or peacebuilding plans where appropriate expertise is present. If aid is handled in a way that helps groups build trust, the aid agency can also create the safe place for these sorts of listening groups. Trust begets trust, since trust can only be built by taking risks, and having the other side act in a trustworthy fashion.<sup>7</sup>

For such groups to work they must have enough trust to agree to the commitment to be constructive. This usually starts with people trusting the person or group organising the process. The facilitator then has to prepare people to do the kind of active, non-defensive listening required for a person to feel heard.

Many attempts have been made to create informal safe places for sharing experiences. These efforts are better than nothing, but do not actually work through the necessary process to get the hoped-for result. Peacebuilding plans need to specifically programme this step toward reconciliation.

Some agencies do not understand their mandate as including peacebuilding. They are interested in using the LCP model to avoid doing harm with their aid. The challenge for them is to cooperate with agencies that do include a peacebuilding agenda in their work, so that the trust created by the relief agencies can be used for this next step to occur. There are conflict-focused organisations prepared to partner with relief-only agencies in this way. If such cooperation is the plan, then it is imperative that the two groups cooperate in developing the intervention plan, working together to identify connectors and dividers.

### **Restoring the Equity**

After people have shared their feelings of injustice and successfully felt heard, they are ready for the important step where we ask the question: 'Now that we know that, what must we do to make things as right as possible between us?' This is often the missing step in reconciliation attempts. If someone borrows your camera and returns it broken with an apology, is that enough? Of course not. A person must do what she/he can to repair or replace the camera. That is the 'restoring the equity' step. You may not be able to pay for a new camera, but between yourselves you can figure out what to do. In thousands of victim offender cases it has been shown that when the offender does what they can to make things right, the victim is able to respond with the grace necessary to complete the transaction.

This step is the one most often missed by those working at reconciliation attempts. In the case of official truth and reconciliation commissions it is usually politics and the strength of the groups responsible which prevent any meaningful efforts toward this step (Bronkhorst 1995). Aid agencies and peacebuilders can programme in the types of activities that allow members of one group to do something to make up for the damage their group has done. A mixed group of Muslims and Christians rebuilding burned churches and mosques is an example.

The key to this step is that both sides agree together what the restitutionary actions will be. The people or groups who do the listening in the 'acknowledging injustices' stage must then be the ones to decide together what can be done to make things as right as possible. Peacebuilders can facilitate the process and provide some necessary support

for doing the work after agreements are made. Food for work programmes could be tied to such agreements to enable the restitution to be done as well as the distribution of emergency aid.

Aid programmes, which are not designed to support this step are, in effect, denying it to people and thus doing harm. Such programmes are rewarding the dividers in the community. Aid without a tie to peacebuilding goals is not benign. A stance of refusing to tie aid to anything ends up tying it to strengthening dividers, an unfortunate unintended consequence. It is also a mistake to be so focused on a peacemaking agenda, that in the process people don't get fed. LCP looks for balance, and that includes peacemaking goals.

Making and keeping agreements at this restitution stage is what really begins to build trust. It's all talk up to this point. Now a tangible product shows you have meant what you said. When conciliatory talk meets conciliatory action, reconciliation can begin to happen. Representatives of inter-group conflict may undertake this process.

### **Being Clear About Future Intentions**

This last step is easy to miss, but important to include. If my group burned your house because people from your group hurt them, and we go through the process described above, agreeing to help you rebuild your house. Shouldn't that be enough? It isn't. The nagging question remains: will you burn my house again? If I ask that question and you say no, each day that goes by without another attack builds trust. In the case of inter-group violence, agreements about the future and monitoring of compliance are very important. Building in agreements about the future, how they will be monitored and how violations will be handled are a critical piece of any peacebuilding plan. Once again, it is not difficult to include these things in a humanitarian aid plan if they are thought of.

### ***Reconciling Interests***

When we have finished a reconciling injustices process, we may have finished. We may also have some other things to work through. The conflict flowchart invites us to move over to the reconciling interests' process to work on those other things. For inter-group violence situations, it will be important to do this step as well. Aid agencies can provide critical assistance in creating a safe place for this work, and encouraging participation. This is the stage where the aid agency and the people being assisted work together.

The process is simple. First you identify and involve all the stakeholders. This must be carefully done or failure results. These stakeholders, usually through representatives, identify all their main concerns, or interests, surrounding the subject. If it is emergency relief or a community development project there will be many competing demands. Look beneath these for the underlying interests that drive the demands. Positions or demands can only be satisfied one way. They can't be negotiated. Interests are negotiable and can be handled in a variety of ways. Once all the interests of all the stakeholders are listed, a plan is made which addresses all those needs. Choices are made and a plan results (Fisher & Ury 1983). While simple, this process can take several days, and needs a skilled facilitator. The aid agency is a participant, and its needs must be included.

The LCP model does not yet speak to this idea of stakeholders working together to create a plan to meet all their needs. I would suggest this as an important addition. It maximises connectors in the process, even creating many new ones. Plans developed in this way are solid and effective.

## **Conclusion**

Connectors and dividers are good categories to think through in identifying local capacities for peace. By coupling that analysis with an analysis of the connectors needed for successful reconciliation of both injustices and interests, aid groups and other peacebuilders can go much further toward the goal of peace. A relief or development plan which does not prepare aid recipients for successful conflict resolution can actually make conflict resolution and reconciliation less likely. It is therefore incumbent upon aid workers to plan so as not only do no harm, but to actually prepare the way for peacebuilding. Cooperation between aid workers and conflict resolution practitioners from the beginning phases of a project may be the best way to accomplish this goal.

Peacebuilding is a necessary part of development, not a luxury item to be sacrificed to speed or budgets. Relief or development which ignores the requirements of peacebuilding sows the seeds of its own failure as new cycles of violence undo the good that was done. The LCP model focuses on not doing harm, and should be of great assistance to aid agencies. Without the additional lens of peacebuilding, however, the LCP model is inadequate. Conflict resolution and reconciliation require the rebuilding of trust in a society between contending parties. Relief and development can be an important part of that process.

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## **Endnotes**

1. During 1999-2001 the author was on leave under Mennonite Central Committee (MCC) to Pusat Studi dan Pengembangan Perdamaian (Center for the Study and Promotion of Peace) of Duta Wacana Christian University in Yogyakarta, Indonesia ([www.ukdw.ac.id/lpip/pspp](http://www.ukdw.ac.id/lpip/pspp)). There he discussed the nexus of relief, development and peacebuilding with executives of most of the large international non-governmental organisations and a number of multi-lateral organisations. The original draft of this paper was written to assist in that discussion and the helpful comments by colleagues in Indonesia are greatly appreciated.
2. The Peace Studies Association notes on its web page that there were over 200 university peace studies programs as of February 1, 2001. <http://www.earlham.edu/~psa/history.html>
3. Pusat Studi dan Pengembangan Perdamaian [PSPP] (Center for the Study and Promotion of Peace) is a unit of Universitas Kristen Duta Wacana (UKDW). Its Pemberdayaan untuk Rekonsiliasi (Empowering for Reconciliation) workshops, both basic and advanced, are described on the PSPP web site <http://www.ukdw.ac.id/pspp> in English and Indonesian. The concepts described in this paper derive from the Advanced Empowering for Reconciliation workshop as developed by the author working with the faculty of UKDW.
4. There are many good sources of information on the conflict in the Maluku Islands, commonly known as the Spice Islands. Unfortunately, only a limited number are in English. Human Rights Watch has an excellent background paper available on the Web at <http://www.hrw.org/reports/1999/ambon/> A Dutch Web site gives daily extracts from Indonesian news sources in both English and Dutch at <http://www.infomaluku.net>, and also has links to other documents and articles.
5. During September 2001 the author participated in discussions on education for peace sponsored

by UNICEF in the city of Ambon, and had the opportunity to interact with people from various educational and public service organisations.

6. This analysis came from dozens of conversations with people working at peacebuilding in Ambon. Pusat Studi dan Pengembangan Perdamaian was the home of Tim Independen Rekonsiliasi Ambon, an inter-religious group of residents of Java devoted to helping the Ambonese people work for peace. The author's role as Director of Peace Programmes for Mennonite Central Committee Indonesia put him in contact with these and many other people directly involved with the issues.
7. The idea of trust growing when one takes a risk with someone and is rewarded by his or her trustworthy behaviour is an old one. The first reference I am aware of occurs in the Old Testament Book 1 Samuel where King Saul accused David of rebellion and was chasing him. Saul decided to relieve himself in privacy and used the cave where David was hiding. David stealthily cut off a piece of Saul's robe, and then later used it to prove he was worthy of the king's trust.

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